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Book Reviews
Insurgents & Insurgencies
The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the
American Way of War
By Fred Kaplan
Reviewed by Brigadier General Kimberly C. Field, Deputy Director, Strategy
Plans and Policy, DA 3/5/7

F

or my promotion, John Nagl gave me a copy of Fred Kaplan’s The
Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War
signed by the military journalist himself. And so, the book opens: “A few
days shy of his 25th birthday, John Nagl saw his future disappear.” The
book chronicles a small group’s attempt to shift the American way of
war from one of high-tech, big weapons focused on enemy combatants,
to one that held people as the center of gravity. Kaplan’s account—there
are others, and there will be more—is worth a read, even if Nagl isn’t
your friend.
The Insurgents is a readable and informative account of a critical time
in the history of American involvement in conflicts overseas, regardless
of whether or not you accept the conclusions. Throughout the book,
Kaplan weaves descriptions of the Department of Defense culture—
including examples like Andy Marshall’s Revolution in Military Affairs,
and Bosnia not being a “real war”—with the academic and military
background of a small group of thinkers, many anchored in West Point
and its Department of Social Sciences. This group includes David
Petraeus, John Nagl, David Kilcullen, Mike Meese, Ike Wilson, H. R.
McMaster, Sarah Sewell, Gunner Sepp, Bill Hix, and their most important professional and academic influencers—Jack Galvin, David Galula,
Alexander George, T. E. Lawrence, and others.
Kaplan provides the reader a play-by-play account of the intellectual
wrangling that occurred within the Pentagon, inside the national security
decisionmaking apparatus of the Bush and Obama Administrations, and
on the ground in Iraq. He builds to the implication that the consequence
of the group’s effort was the replacement of one doctrine (air-land battle)
with another (COIN). This took a herculean effort by a unique group
of true believers to recalibrate the machine, but once accomplished, the
machine could not get the entire job done. He excuses the leaders of the
COIN movement by concluding that some wars are winnable (Iraq) and
some are not (Afghanistan).
Good as this tale is, I admit to feeling a “here we go again” exasperation about halfway through: more glorification of a certain set of
people, chief among them General David Petraeus. Kaplan is guilty of
marginalizing other leaders who were instrumental in developing and
implementing COIN strategy. Two kinds of contributions were required
to change the military: those who drove an intellectually rigorous
process that required bureaucratic and political savvy; and those who
implemented the policy in the field and then fed back necessary adaptations. The Insurgents emphasized the thinkers, not the doers.
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The overlap of the two sets is mostly limited to one man, David
Petraeus—a conceptual thinker who starts with an understanding of
the problem and the big ideas associated with it, values academia and
multiple perspectives, is hyper-efficient in his habits, made it his job
to master his role in the body politic, and has the personal fortitude
to operationalize all of it. So I am able to put a better point on the
exasperation expressed above: it is the rarity of the combination Petraeus
embodies that damns the military culture, and so we have yet another
author criticizing the dearth of creative thinking and courage among
the military’s ranks.
Indeed, Kaplan cannot help but take jabs at the military as he
chronicles the struggle it took to adapt. He says “only the most confident and nurtured young officer” would take on the Army establishment
as Petreaus did with an article he ghost wrote for Galvin. He implies
Nagl’s retirement as a lieutenant colonel had to do with writing that
the Army was not a learning organization. He characterizes the “Sosh”
Department as comprised of officers who doubted the judgment of their
superiors, implying they were correct to do so. He states that during the
Cold War, being an MP or a Civil Affairs officer was “no way to get
ahead, so the best officers steered clear”. He writes, “TRADOC got a
new commander who saw no point in long range thinking” during the
1990s. Is Kaplan correct in his commentary about the Army? Where
there’s smoke there’s bound to be fire, but the truth is almost always in
the middle. Those who cling to the centrality of force-on-force do so for
good reason; but given that military power alone will be decisive only
in the most limited-objective scenarios, DOD must ensure the conventional force culture does not preclude the agility and creativity required
to provide a full range of options essential to safeguarding the interests
of the American people.
The book has one other major flaw: it digs deep into Iraq but skims
over Afghanistan. Let’s set aside the questions of whether or not we
really “won” in Iraq, and whether we thoughtlessly conflated COIN
planning and doctrine with the strategic objectives we tried to achieve in
Afghanistan. Did the “COINdinistas” get it right? Perhaps so in Iraq
and Kaplan explains that well. Afghanistan was, and is, another matter,
and his explanation is unsatisfying on two levels.
By the surge in Afghanistan, operationally, COIN had perhaps
turned into “dogma,” but not because the COIN leaders held onto it as
written in 2006. Rather, because, as Kaplan does not quite say, they did not
hang onto it . . . and did not proclaim this rejection publicly. By publicly
espousing a comprehensive COIN strategy and privately rejecting all but
the emphasis on security (and indeed, General Petraeus put significant
personal energy into the Afghan Local Police program), the opportunity
to adapt the broader COIN doctrine and strategy was precluded. To
my mind, watching and participating one level down, General Petraeus
accepted Galula’s necessary preconditions for success in a counterinsurgency campaign, and finding none of them in Afghanistan, changed
course. He inherited a COIN campaign plan that may or may not have
been right, and then quietly used members of the original COIN team,
Jack Keane and the Kagans in particular, to focus almost exclusively on
kill-capture. The potential result is ironic and harmful: no more COIN.
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But Kaplan also does not quite say that General Petraeus was astutely
reading the political writing on the wall and probably knew the mission
was not going to be resourced as much or as long as required—which
was the biggest problem of all with Afghanistan. And here Kaplan really
comes up short: he seems to credit and even applaud the administration
with out-foxing its military leaders, and provides no further analysis on
whether or not that was the correct thing to do with regard to mission
accomplishment. In fact, I could not help but feel I was taken on a bit
of a ride. Kaplan spends a good deal of the book building up Petraeus
and the group, only to take some glee by ultimately implying not only
that they got what they deserved in Afghanistan, but that the Obama
administration was brighter than the best of the brightest.
Kaplan writes of the eventual recognition that “Afghanistan is not
Iraq.” Right, it’s not. But understanding did not lead to meaningful adaptation operationally or politically. We simply have to understand where we
went wrong in Afghanistan in all realms. We cannot thoughtlessly throw
the COIN bathwater out with the Afghanistan baby. Kaplan tap-dances
around these most critical issues. Perhaps he had a foregone conclusion
about the Afghan mission; perhaps he felt he had to tread carefully with
regard to General Petraeus while lauding the Obama administration.
Nor is it my intent to tarnish anyone's armor. Simply because a
mentor and role model reaches a super-human limit (in part due to the
bottom-line principle under which we operate—civilian control of the
military), does not negate his super-human contributions. The Insurgents
throws something else into stark relief—as indefatigable as General
Petreaus is, it is somehow unbelievable and unfair that we as a nation
should have been so dependent on the energy, intellect, leadership, and
savvy of one man for so long. Regardless of whether or not he cultivated
that position, when he was finally “beat” we should take no satisfaction
in it. I can’t help but think of lives lost.
The “plot to change the American way of war” had a larger point: the
requirement to meet national objectives in situations in which an adversary’s military forces are not the center of gravity is enduring. Regardless
of “we won’t do long, big COIN operations anymore” proclamations,
the country will undoubtedly need those skills for small, short missions
. . . or, indeed, another unexpectedly long, big war.
An interagency group should conduct a comprehensive lessonslearned analysis of this toughest of COIN scenarios—the strategic
case study that is Afghanistan. In this reviewer’s opinion, the required
security-governance progression was much less linear in Afghanistan
than Iraq; the development effort should have started with strengths
instead of the bottomless “needs” pit; the effort needed rational decisiveness from Washington with regard to handling the Karzai regime;
and “Af-Pak” should have gone beyond titular.
If we arrive at a dead end, only then should we say Kaplan’s conclusions were right after all—some wars are not winnable no matter what
brain power you throw at them. Call it countercultural for an Army
officer to believe mission accomplishment of any kind is impossible. Or
call it a necessary part of being a member of a learning organization.
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War From The Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century
Combat as Politics
By Emile Simpson
Reviewed by Dr. Richard M. Swain, Colonel, USA Retired

W
New York: Columbia
University Press, 2012
256 pages
$32.50

ar From the Ground Up is a theoretical reflection on the meaning of
the Afghanistan counterinsurgency for war theory. It was written
during an Oxford Defense Fellowship by a wonderfully literate infantry officer who served in Helmand with the Royal Gurkha Rifles. The
author’s core insight is that counterinsurgency differs from traditional
interstate war in the sense that, whereas the latter seeks to create, by battle
and maneuver, a military condition that can be the basis of a political
result; military action in counterinsurgency “directly seeks political, as
opposed to specifically military, outcomes . . . . ” The result, at least in
Afghanistan (elaborating on David Kilkullen and Antonio Giustozzi),
is a conflict more like a domestic political contest than a Clausewitzian
“bipolar” struggle. The value of the book is less this observation than
what the author does with it, and how well he does what he sets out to
do. He presents an argument that stands, as Sir Michael Howard has
observed elsewhere, as a “coda” on Clausewitz, filling out the master’s
description of limited war in the particular context of the early twentyfirst century.
Simpson points out that Clausewitz’s simplifying description of
war as a two-sided (“bi-polar”) confrontation does not fit the highly
fragmented, largely “domestic,” political struggle in Afghanistan or the
expansion of the relevant strategic audience imposed by the ubiquity
of immediate global communications. He adopts the view that combat
becomes a form of public communication. From this, he draws a distinction between the idea of strategy as the instrumental use of force, and the
now especially critical function of providing an interpretive framework
within which to convey a desired meaning to critical audiences. Not just
battle, but war itself is instrumental.
In addition to constructing a sophisticated updating of Clausewitzian
theory, Simpson addresses the importance of what this reviewer might
characterize as “dialogic command,” an authoritative relationship sensitive to the need for negotiating the tension between the desired and
the possible outcomes from policy to execution. Simpson calls this
“Strategic dialog . . . the reciprocal interaction between policy, in the
sense of the political decisions and intentions of the state, and how
policy is articulated as actual operations . . . .” His concern involves the
compound danger of naive decisionmakers at the top and the ubiquity
below of the figure Americans call the “strategic corporal,” the relatively
minor tactical leader whose actions or inactions can advance or derail
the grander efforts of which they are part.
Here again, Simpson shows his mettle with a critique, perhaps a
bit rigid, of Samuel Huntington’s 1957 treatise on civil-military relations, Soldier and the State. Simpson’s point, very much like Eliot Cohen’s
Supreme Command, is that strict separation of the military function and
civil direction has long since become counterproductive. He might have,
but does not, observe that the descriptive social science on which Soldier
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and the State was based was old at the time Huntington wrote, and the
character of professions has evolved a good deal since 1957. Simpson
makes a minor historical error subordinating Moltke to Bismarck in
their famous struggle outside Paris in 1871. In that event, the struggle
took place because the general and chancellor were parallel officials,
both directly subordinate to the Prussian King. To use Huntington to
draw a sharp distinction between constitutional and strategic imperatives of civil-military relations, Simpson ignores the advisory function
that professional soldiers owe to their constitutional masters as well as
final obedience, Cohen’s “unequal dialog.”
The structure of the book seems a bit out of balance, first between
emphasis on the particular case of counterinsurgency as opposed to the
broader category of limited war, then on the relative importance of action
versus interpretation. In the first case, a fine chapter on the “British
Strategy in the Borneo Confrontation, 1962-6” approaches making the
more general case, but never quite closes on the point. In the latter,
the penultimate two chapters, which address strategic narrative, leave a
sense that the entire discussion has been pointed toward predominance
of interpretation over action. Grounded on concepts from Aristotle’s
Rhetoric, they are excellent in their own right, but might better have been
located earlier in the text.
Neither the introduction nor conclusion conveys fully the great
wealth of thought that lies between. The great strength of the book is in
the author’s clarity of explanation and his theoretical sense, firmly based
on useful definition and clear, didactic distinctions. This book should find
an important place in War College, School of Advanced Military Studies
(SAMS), Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAWS), and
Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) seminars.
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The United States in Central Asia
War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, 2001-2011
By Robert M. Cassidy
Reviewed by John A. Nagl, Minerva Research Professor at the US Naval
Academy and author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Quantico: Marine Corps
University Press, 2012
270 pages
Free download

A

lthough the war in Afghanistan has lasted appreciably longer than
America’s war in Iraq, the shorter conflict has generated both more
and better literature and analysis. There are a stack of books on Iraq that
will bear the test of time, from George Packer’s The Assassins’ Gate and
Tom Ricks’s Fiasco to Michael Gordon and Mick Trainor’s comprehensive
trilogy on the war. The longer Afghan campaign can claim no such body
of work is likely to last. Carter Malkasian’s War Comes to Garmser is a
sparkling depiction of the conflict in a province, but there is as yet no
overview of the war as a whole that will endure.
Army Colonel Bob Cassidy has attempted to fill the gap with War,
Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011,
published by the Marine Corps University Press and freely available
on the internet. Bob is well placed to do so, having written two previous books on counterinsurgency and spending a year working at the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command, which
coordinates the campaign at the operational level of war. The book meets
some of the need for a comprehensive analysis of the Afghan conflict,
but is hobbled by two shortcomings—one unavoidable, one not—that
leave the field at least partially open for a great campaign history.
The unavoidable shortcoming of War, Will, and Warlords comes in
its subtitle; the book only carries the reader through 2011, concentrating most heavily on fighting since the Obama administration prioritized
Afghanistan over Iraq in 2009. While Cassidy is correct in noting that
before late 2009, “the war in Afghanistan lacked both a comprehensive
counterinsurgency campaign plan and an operational-level headquarters
to orchestrate the campaign,” the Afghan campaign has become more
interesting, not less, since he completed his analysis in 2011, and the
trend is likely to continue. Although the Afghan endgame cannot yet be
written, the president decided to draw down the American troop commitment and turn over responsibility for the continuing counterinsurgency
campaign to the Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. This is high
adventure; while the Anbar Awakening and the Surge broke the back of
the insurgency in Iraq before the American drawdown there, the Pashtun
insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan is likely to remain a significant
threat to Afghan governance when the American combat role ends.
Cassidy deserves credit for attempting to capture the history of the war
up until 2011, but the climactic acts of this play have not yet happened.
The avoidable shortcoming is Dr. Cassidy’s writing style. Bob is an
old friend and former partner in crime at the US Military Academy,
where we taught international relations together at the Department of
Social Sciences; from that time through today, Bob has never been able to
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resist inserting the most complicated possible word in his writing. Thus,
on the second page of his Preface, Bob explains that his book “posits
that explanations for the catalysts of these two insurgencies relate to a
paucity of analysis and resources that exacerbated or created grievances
among the local populations, excessive or inappropriate applications
of lethal force, and ill-prepared approaches to information operations
that failed to integrate information narratives with the use of military
force.” This rather convoluted sentence is in fact a road map to the major
lenses through which Bob analyzes the counterinsurgency campaigns
in Afghanistan and Pakistan: legitimacy; use of force; and information
operations, both during the enemy-focused period from 2001 through
2009, labeled “The Pursuit of Evil,” and during the population-security
focused “Pursuit of Peace” from 2009 through 2011. The lenses work
well and provide significant insight, as does the bifurcation of the campaign into two phases.
There is much more goodness in the book, and it fully meets its
self-described purpose of exploring “the U.S.-led Coalition and the
U.S.-supported Pakistani efforts in countering the Taliban/al-Qaeda
insurgencies in both of these countries to date.” Bob does a real service
by pointing out not just how under-resourced the AfPak campaign was
until President Obama’s arrival, but also to what extent the Durand Line
fails to demarcate a conflict that America and her allies have to conduct
in very different ways on different sides of the Afghan/Pakistan border.
Here his eloquence is both appropriate and enjoyable: “If Afghanistan
is a challenging conundrum, Pakistan is the puzzle nested within the
enigma that relates directly and inexorably to security and stability in
Afghanistan.” After asking whether Pakistan is “With Us or Against
Us?” in Chapter 3, he concludes that the Pashtun Belt in Pakistan is
“Hard and Not Hopeful” in Chapter 5. The more one learns of Pakistan,
here and from other sources, the more discouraging—and more
correct—this conclusion appears.
Cassidy is on firm ground when he notes that “Very few counterinsurgencies throughout history have met with success when the
insurgents have benefited from unimpeded sanctuary and external
support.” Given that fact and Pakistan’s long track record of perfidy, it is
hard to echo Cassidy’s cautious optimism about “being more sanguine,
albeit in a qualified way” about Pakistan’s willingness to stop supporting, much less begin fighting against, the Taliban who pass freely from
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Afghanistan and back.
The last chapter of War, Will, and Warlords is a history of the ISAF
Joint Command (IJC) titled “Operational Counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan until 2011.” While Bob is somewhat more impressed with
the significance of the IJC’s contributions than am I, his first-person
and on-the-ground perspective make this chapter—like the book as a
whole—a significant contribution to the analysis of America’s longest
war, regardless of the fact that it remains too soon for even the most
perspicacious interlocutor to conclusively determine the ultimate trajectory of the conflict.
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The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year
Conflict with Iran
By David Crist
W. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D. is a research professor at the US Army War College at
Carlisle Barracks, PA and the author of Global Security Watch Jordan (Praeger,
2010)
New York: Penguin Press,
2012
638 pages
$36.00

D

avid Crist’s The Twilight War is a methodical and comprehensive
description and analysis of the US-Iranian relationship from
the 1979 Iranian revolution until the first three years of the Obama
administration. As such, it is an important contribution to the effort
to understand the US-Iranian relationship which comes at a time when
serious commentators throughout the world routinely speak of the possibility of war between the two nations. Crist is particularly qualified to
write this study as a US government historian who wrote his doctoral dissertation on this subject and continued his research on this subject for a
number of additional years. He is also an officer in the US Marine Corps
Reserve with extensive Middle East service and the son of a former
commander of US Central Command (USCENTCOM). As preparation
for writing this book, he conducted a substantial number of interviews
with US government officials involved in formulating Iranian policy,
including many people at the top level of the policymaking process. He
also made extensive and productive use of large numbers of declassified
documents. The result of this effort is a masterpiece, developed through
his skills as a historian as well as his understanding of US governmental
processes and military operations and strategy.
Throughout the work, Crist notes the activities and views of various
personalities in the White House, the State and Defense Departments,
USCENTCOM, and other organizations involved in formulating and
implementing Iran policy. An additional strength of the book is Crist’s
discussion of efforts by various regional allies to influence US policies
toward Iran. Saudi Arabia is a particularly important player in this effort,
although a number of other regional countries including Israel have
sought to influence Iran policy as well. More to the point of the title,
Crist uses declassified information to provide surprisingly comprehensive discussions of US espionage and covert actions in Iran as well as the
activities of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
He further provides an extensive and fine-grained analysis of the numerous confrontations at sea between US and Iranian naval forces as well as
Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks against US targets in Lebanon. All of
this is done with a straightforward and compelling writing style.
The actions of the Reagan administration consume a significant
portion of this work. There are some solid intellectual reasons for
this approach, since the 1980-88 timeframe witnessed a prolonged US
confrontation of an energized Iran as well as the Iran-Iraq War. This
was also one of the most critical eras for individuals in both nations to
decide if reconciliation was possible or not. The Reagan administration
leadership, especially the president, basically believed most of the problems the United States faced overseas resulted from the efforts of the
Soviet Union. The US administration correspondingly viewed Iranian
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events through the filter of the Cold War, and Reagan had hoped the
two religious nations could align against the Soviets. This improvement
of relations clearly did not occur, and the two countries instead entered
into a quasi-war involving confrontations at sea, armed clashes involving
Iranian proxies in Lebanon, and extensive efforts at covert action. Yet
Reagan was never fully prepared to give up on Tehran and is described
as deeply hopeful that the secret supply of weapons provided to Iran
during the Iran-Contra Affair could yield important results. Instead, the
initiative declined into nothing more than a weapons-for-hostages swap
and then a major political scandal. Future presidents would take these
events as a warning of the dangers of dealing with Iran.
Crist also writes a valuable and insightful account of the relations
between later administrations and Iran, but his access to declassified
source material clearly thins out over time. President George H. W. Bush is
portrayed as cautiously seeking improved relations with Tehran for some
of the same reasons as the Reagan administration, but mutual suspicions
made this effort impossible and the president backed away from promised goodwill gestures that were to follow the release of remaining US
hostages in Lebanon. President Clinton and Iranian President Khatami
also showed some interest in accommodation, but Khatami was too
internally weak to respond to the modest American hints about improving relations. Things changed again after Clinton left office. Relatively
early in his administration, President George W. Bush included Iran in
a rhetorical “axis of evil.” This statement took the Iranians by surprise
since they had been working in tandem with US interests in Afghanistan,
and did not expect such a harsh denunciation from the administration.
The rapid defeat of Iraq’s conventional military in 2003 also alarmed the
Iranians and caused them to show an increased interest in a rapprochement with the United States. Such a rapprochement had no appeal for
the Bush administration, which expected US interests to be secured by a
post-Saddam, democratic Iraq that would inspire other Arab nations and
Iran to overthrow undemocratic leaders. The administration, therefore,
rejected the concept of dialogue on the basis of neoconservative ideology, although it remains uncertain what accommodations Iran would
actually make. According to Iranian documents provided through Swiss
intermediaries, they were prepared to give up a great deal, but these
suggestions of accommodation were never tested. Also, as the United
States became more bogged down in Iraq, the Iranians became much
less fearful that they faced a serious threat from the United States. Their
interest in an accommodation declined accordingly.
President Obama came into office openly hoping to improve
US-Iranian relations but eventually shifted to a policy of sanctions and
preparations for war, which Crist describes as “a policy nearly identical
to that of his predecessor.” Crist does not directly assert US involvement
in the Stuxnet computer malware attack on Iranian sites as David Sanger
does in Confront and Conceal, but he does state that “[s]ecurity experts
believed the evidence pointed to a joint US and Israeli program.” Obama
had initially hoped that Iran might be willing to respond to his entreaties
for better relations with at least some limited gestures of goodwill, but
Tehran chose instead to behave in ways that the US State Department
described as “disappointing and unconstructive.” Crist, nevertheless,
identifies Obama’s policy of seeking negotiations as a much more
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sophisticated approach than has been widely realized. Once the initial
policy of diplomacy failed to gain the desired results, Obama’s credibility
in seeking global sanctions against Iran was dramatically greater. Thus,
the United States and Iran were again locked in a hostile relationship
that threatened to become more difficult as the Iranians continued to
move forward on a nuclear capability.
Crist’s book does not end optimistically. He suggests that antiAmericanism remains a pillar of the Iranian government policies and
that this approach is unlikely to change while members of the revolutionary generation remain in power. But does that mean that war is inevitable
or even likely? Crist’s study ended long before the most recent policies
of economic sanctions really caught fire. Obama has now applied a very
serious stick, and Iran can hardly ignore its contracting economy or the
significant drop in the value of its currency. While anti-Americanism
may be popular among the Iranian leadership, economic misery may be
even more unpopular than agreeing to US demands on nuclear weapons
issues. The shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979 partially because he lost
the support of the urban poor. These people are now struggling under
sanctions, although not starving due to the artificially low price of staple
foods. The lesson of a discontented underclass would not be lost on the
revolutionary generation, and the rise of new and more pragmatic Iranian
leaders is also at least vaguely possible. Meanwhile, the United States and
Iran remain engaged in something at least akin to a twilight war.
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The Rise and Fall of American Military Power
Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power
By Rachel Maddow
Reviewed by Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA Ret., Professor of Leadership and
Cultural Studies, US Army War College.

R

achel Maddow is probably the best well-known woman commentator in the twenty-first century. Host of The Rachel Maddow Show on
MSNBC, her brand is one of biting humor and striking analysis from
a liberal perspective. I expect she would be amused and flattered that a
review of her book, Drift, is included in Parameters. To dismiss Maddow
out-of-hand as a liberal policy wonk would be imprudent given her credentials as a Rhodes Scholar who holds a Doctorate of Philosophy in
Politics from Oxford University.
Drift is her first book and could easily have been written as a string
of half-hour commentaries on the state of the US military. Given the
nine chapters with prologue and epilogue, this would fit the format of a
week-long series for her news show. As the “Unmooring” title suggests,
Maddow’s premise is the manifestation of American military power is
insufficiently linked to the national discourse on its use. Her concerns
are American military power has migrated from that envisioned by the
founding fathers, debate between the executive and legislative branches
on its use is ineffective, and, perhaps most important, there is a dangerous lack of engagement and accountability with the American people.
Accordingly, Maddow opens the book with a 1795 quote from thenCongressman (and “Father of the Constitution”) James Madison, “Of all
enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded. . . . War is
the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes. . . . In war, too, the
discretionary power of the Executive is extended . . . and all the means of
seducing the minds are added to those of subduing the force of the people.”
Her focus is on military power that emerged with the national experience of the Vietnam War. Two key items sprung from that conflict—the
restructuring of the Army Guard and Reserve by then-Chief of Staff
Creighton Abrams and the War Powers Resolution of 1973—serve as the
foundation of Maddow’s discourse on the American attitude toward persistent conflict and war. She contends it is, “as if peace . . . made us edgy, as
if we no longer knew, absent an armed conflict, how to be our best selves.”
Her analysis of modern US history has four main tenets that interested this reviewer, which individually and collectively decoupled the US
military from its society. The reforms of General Abrams were designed
to ensure that citizen-soldiers were inextricably bound to deployments
for major military operations, such that when the president and Congress
committed to war, the nation was also committed across a wide swath
of its population. Concurrently, the War Powers Resolution was a clear
attempt by Congress to check the presidential power to commit US
forces without informing Congress and obtaining its authorization.
While enacted during the term of a Republican president (Richard
Nixon), the challenge to executive power existed prior to and since with
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presidents of both political parties. Maddow provides several examples
from Grenada, Iraq, and Bosnia to contemporary operations.
The restructuring of the US military as a volunteer force with
limited numbers to perform the “inherently governmental in nature”
functions of warfighting led to the understandable emergence of outsourcing other functions with programs such as the Logistics Civilian
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The use of contractors has
become an accepted practice where the number of contract personnel
(those that can be counted) routinely exceeds the number of deployed
uniformed servicemembers in the operations of the past two decades.
Maddow has two issues with this—first, this shadow military in the
guise of contractors exists with little or no oversight and, second, its
members are not held accountable for their misdeeds in theaters of
operations. The results, she posits, is the president and Congress can
deploy the military without directly affecting the majority of the US
population. If uniformed members performed the contracted functions,
then a larger number of reserve component servicemembers would be
involved in military operations—hence, more “skin in the game” for our
citizens. The last tenet is the overlapping responsibilities of warfighting between the US military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
National Security Agency, where the latter two have little oversight from
Congress and virtually no visibility with the American people who fund
their operations.
Conservatives will take issue with Maddow’s deconstruction of
President Ronald Reagan, who is their icon of executive leadership and
power. Military readers may be uncomfortable with her examination
and critique of military operations over the past two decades. The
value of Maddow’s work is the presentation of facts and her journalistic
interpretation of their impact. The reader may be distracted by quips
and stinging commentary—focus instead on the themes and the logic
of her argument. This reviewer found several parallels to the analysis
and conclusions of conservative scholar Andrew Bacevich in his The
New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (see Parameters
review Winter 2005-2006).
What we see is the incremental adjustment of policy to adapt to
changing environmental conditions and to address existing problems.
The rationale for individual decisions are understandable—presidents
want the power to respond to developing problems and crises, senior
military leaders seek to have the will of the nation (read people) supporting the force, and both civilian and military leaders have been educated
to protect core competencies by otherwise sourcing enabling functions.
The collective impact is a loosely coupled manifestation of military
power in its institutional structure, its delineated responsibilities, and
the national discourse of how it is applied.
Maddow effectively makes the case “drift” has occurred and provides the challenge to US leaders to examine our current position in the
global landscape and, with intentionality, to firmly reattach the lines to
our dock of national values and interest. As such, this book is a highly
recommended addition to the library of national security professionals
who value diverse perspectives and well-reasoned analysis.
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Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the
Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream
By Gregg Jones
Reviewed by Leonard J. Fullenkamp, COL (USA Retired), Professor of Military
History, US Army War College

A

merica went to war in 1898 for a noble cause—to lift the yoke of
Spanish colonial oppression from the peoples of Cuba and the
Philippines. Although ill-equipped for expeditionary warfare, the United
States Army, Navy, and fledgling Marine Corps, managed in short order
to deploy forces sufficiently capable of securing victories in both the
Caribbean island and distant archipelago in the Pacific. Flush with the
spoils of its easy victories, the United States quickly installed a compliant government in the Philippines, with the objective of developing
the former Spanish colony into a distant outpost from where parochial
national interests could be looked after. Filipino nationalists, led by Emilio
Aguinaldo, objected to the replacement of one colonial power with
another, sparking an insurgency that spread throughout the islands. Years
of counterinsurgency warfare followed, during which time American
values were sorely tested as allegations of torture and brutality toward
enemy soldiers and the civilian population who supported them became
a daily staple of reporting in the newspapers of William Randolph Hearst
and Joseph Pulitzer. American honor, so highly trumpeted at the onset
of the war, became mired in the dust of discouragement and disappointment as victory in the war against the insurgents proved elusive.
Gregg Jones’s account of America’s well-intentioned, but ill-fated,
experiment with colonialism is told in a narrative style that reminds the
reader of the author’s roots as a journalist. There is much in the story
that appeals to these sometimes prurient instincts, such as the prologue,
which begins with a vivid description of US troops using a form of interrogation euphemistically referred to as “the water cure” on a suspected
insurgent. From the outset it is clear that Jones finds many parallels
between the War in the Philippines and America’s experiences in later
wars in general, and the Global War on Terror in particular.
For many readers this will be an introduction to a forgotten chapter
in our nation’s history. The book begins with an overview of events
leading to the outbreak of war; fighting in Cuba, to include an account
of Roosevelt’s Rough Riders and Kettle Hill; and Dewey’s defeat of the
Spanish navy in Manila Bay. With the onset of a counterinsurgency
campaign, the narrative gathers a momentum that carries through the
rest of the book. How American values fell victim to the charges that
would tarnish the nation’s honor is the question Jones finds morbidly
interesting. In short, at the tactical level of war, the answer lies with
badly trained and poorly led troops confronting an unfamiliar style of
warfare and resorting to brutal tactics, including torture, in their efforts
to defeat the insurgents. At the strategic level, the explanations are far
more complex, involving a moral struggle over American values and
interests. The fighting in the Philippines leads to a war of ideas and
values, where factions within Congress, the press, and interest groups
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collectively known as Imperialists and Anti-Imperialists, debate the
wisdom, legitimacy, and morality of a minor war in a distant land.
Jones finds all this fascinating and his enthusiasm for the subject
infuses the narrative. His accounts of soldiers and marines burning
villages, shooting unarmed insurgents, and torturing suspects for information crackle with an energy common to investigative journalism. Is
he, the reader is given to wonder from time to time, commenting on
some aspect of the counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines, or none
too subtly inviting us to consider our recent experiences in the Global
War on Terror, with its allegations of water boarding, civilian casualties
and collateral damages, and the untidy and seemingly open-ended commitment to an endeavor of an uncertain and perhaps unwise outcome?
Intended or not, one finds in Honor in the Dust familiar parallels with
America’s experiences in Vietnam, Somali, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They
all started so well and ended so badly. Why did we not know better?
Haven’t we been there before?
For many readers this will be their first encounter with the history
of this period, which is an unfortunate commentary on so many levels.
For most, this will inform them on an obscure chapter of American
history. Military readers with more than casual interest in counterinsurgency would do well to look to the expert on this period. Professor
Brian Linn’s The Philippine War, 1899-1902 is without doubt the best,
most informed, and balanced account of America’s effort to subdue the
Philippine insurgents. Linn’s account of the fighting is sophisticated,
nuanced, and brimming with insights on counterinsurgency warfare.
As the subtitle suggests, there is more to this book than a discussion
of the war itself. Theodore Roosevelt, whose rise to national prominence catches fire on the notoriety he gained for his heroic exploits in
Cuba, transformed success on the battlefield into success in politics.
When the assassination of William McKinley catapulted him into the
White House, T.R. was left to grapple with the untidy, unconventional
war he had helped create. Domestic politics, and the struggle between
the Imperialists and the Anti-Imperialists, dominates the last quarter
of the book. Among the many interesting characters who shape the
debate are Senators Albert Beveridge, Indiana, who gives voice to the
Imperialists, and Massachusetts Senator George Frisbie Hoar for the
Anti-Imperialists, a member of Roosevelt’s own political party who
asserted that acquisition of territory by force of arms “has been the ruin
of empires and republics of former times,” and, moreover, was “forbidden to us by our Constitution, by our political principles, by every
lesson of our own and of all history.” One need only reflect briefly on
the US war against Mexico to see the wind in his argument, though few
at the time bothered to do so. The “yellow press” sorted out those for
and against the war, and those for and against the factions. Roosevelt
eventually tired of the war, but had to be led to an “honorable exit,” for
which he was indebted to his brilliant Secretary of War, Elihu Root. For
much of the material on Roosevelt, Jones looks to the work of Edmund
Morris. Rightly, he recommends that readers with a taste for more on
Roosevelt’s soldier exploits, as well as his direction of the war, his battles
with Congress, and the opponents of imperialism, look to Morris’s
three-volume biography on the twenty-sixth president.

Book Reviews: The Rise and Fall of American Military Power

143

If there is a disappointment with this book it is with the missed
opportunity to introduce the reader to the transformational changes
that took place within the Army as a result of the war. Two legacies
of the Philippine War are with us today. Intent on reducing the influence and authorities of the Commanding General of the Army, Nelson
Miles, with whom Roosevelt was at odds over the handling of reports of
“torture, summary executions, and other extreme actions by US soldiers
in the Philippines,” the President transformed the Army’s senior general
officer from a Commanding General to Chief of Staff to the Secretary
of War. Jones glosses too quickly over this bit of bureaucratic maneuvering and fails to see its significance. The second missed opportunity is
particularly glaring to this reviewer as Jones makes no mention of the
creation of the Army War College as a direct result of the shortcomings
in preparing for, executing, and ending the Philippine War. Secretary of
War Root was dismayed that the superb Union Army of 1865, capable
of fighting distributed, long-duration operations, over vast distances,
had simply dissolved in the decades after the Civil War, taking with
it the hard-learned insights and lessons so painfully acquired during
the war. Root, determined not to repeat the errors of the past where
knowledge and experience was allowed to evaporate, ordered the establishment of the Army War College, where professional officers would
meet and discuss what he referred to as the three great problems of
war—command, strategy, and the conduct of military operations—
three subjects that still form the basis of the War College curriculum.
Moreover, it is from Elihu Root that the Army War College received
its motto, “Not to promote war, but to preserve peace.” The scaring
experiences of the Philippine War shaped Root’s views, and those in
turn shaped the Army War College.
Jones can be forgiven for overlooking these opportunities. Honor in
the Dust is a readable, interesting, entertaining, and cautionary account
of yet another of America’s forgotten wars. As such, I recommend it.
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Doctrine & Training in American and British Armies
U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War
on Terror
By Walter E. Kretchik
Reviewed by Dr John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army
War College

Lexington: University Press
of Kansas, 2011
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$39.95

U

.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror is an
ambitious book. Walter Kretchik attempts to capture a previously
ignored complex and esoteric subject in a comprehensible manner. He is
a member of a small group of contemporary military historians who are
unafraid to study previously unappealing topics in institutional history,
in this case, Army doctrine. Kretchik is a retired Army officer and an
associate professor of history at Western Illinois University.
Kretchik seeks to provide an overview of the US Army’s dominant doctrinal publications and some of the individuals who shaped
its operations from 1779 to 2008. Kretchik considers doctrine to be a
subcategory of military literature distinguished by two characteristics:
approval by a government authority and mandatory use. As an approved
and prescribed publication, doctrine stands juxtaposed to “informal
practice” which evolves from custom, tradition, and actual experience.
His primary focus is how Army leadership perceived the conduct of
military operations, with less attention paid to administration or sustainment. The author acknowledges he does not consider every Army
doctrinal publication during this long period, but establishes what
constituted the service’s “keystone” manual during a particular era and
judges its impact in preparing the Army to accomplish its mission.
Prior to 1779, no American warfighting doctrine existed as Colonial
militia and Ranger units followed “informal practice.” According
to Kretchik, General George Washington realized by 1778 that the
Continental Army needed a standardized doctrine to regulate tactical
warfare procedures. Baron von Steuben’s Regulations for the Order and
Discipline of the Troops of the United States Army were approved by Congress
in April 1779 and constituted the US Army’s first doctrine. Adaptations
of French or Prussian tactics, essentially branch tactical drill manuals,
constituted the first era of Army doctrine from 1779-1904. This changed
in 1905 when the Root reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the
new Army general staff. The Field Service Regulations of 1905 shifted from
pure tactical branch matters to regulating broader combined arms service
behavior in the field, with the division as the basic combat organization.
Post-World War I, the Field Service Regulations of 1923 captured the lessons
of that war and emphasized field forces within a theater of operations
from groups of armies to divisions, while including considerations of
tanks, the air service, and chemical weapons. On the eve of World War
II in 1939, the Army split Field Service Regulations into three parts: FM
100-5, Operations; FM 100-10, Administration; and FM 100-15, Large Units.
Unfortunately, from this point on, Kretchik only traces FM 100-5 and
its successor, FM 3-0. In 1944, FM 100-5 became multiservice with the
acknowledged requirement for mutual support from the Navy or Air
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Force. Later, in 1962, Army doctrine in FM 100-5 became noticeably
more multinational. General Donn Starry’s 1982 AirLand Battle version
reversed the defensive posture of General William DePuy’s 1976 manual
and assumed a more maneuver-oriented offensive stance. After 1991,
and the end of the Cold War, Army FM 100-5, Operations, contained
more interagency considerations. In addition, as a concession to the
growth of joint doctrine in 2001, the Army renumbered FM 100-5 as
FM 3-0, Operations. Overall, Kretchik believes that doctrine has served
the Army well in preparation for conventional war, but the Army has
noticeably neglected unconventional operations. General Petraeus’s FM
3-24, Counterinsurgency, from 2006 was a notable exception.
While the research for this book is extensive, I believe Kretchik
fails to completely identify the Army’s dominant publication in all
eras. For example, he selects the 1891 Infantry Drill Regulations, and its
update the 1895 Infantry Drill Regulations, as the keystone publication of
its era. “Tactics were explained in clearer language.” He acknowledges,
however, this manual deleted “divisional and brigade movements.” In
addition, Kretchik didn’t consider the 1896 Drill Regulations for Cavalry
that described “independent cavalry” which had strategic raids among
its missions. In addition, by not tracing the evolution of the 1939 FM
100-15, Large Units, or its successor doctrinal publication such as FM
100-7, Decisive Force: Theater Army Operations of 1995, Kretchik fails to
adequately describe the evolution of the Army’s doctrine at the operational to theater strategic level, but instead follows the more tactically
oriented FM 100-5/3-0 doctrinal evolutions. Unfortunately, Kretchik
ended his account with FM 3-0, Operations of 2008 and thereby lacks
the entire revision of Army doctrine started in 2010 and resulted in
FM 3-0 split into Army Doctrinal Pub (ADP) 3-0 and Army Doctrinal
Reference Pub (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations by 2012. Finally,
Kretchik missed the increasing significance of FM 100-1, later FM 1 and
now ADP 1, The Army. This has been the Army Chief of Staff’s personal
document and now provides a superior presentation of the Army to
external audiences than does ADP 3-0.
Regardless of this criticism, U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American
Revolution to the War on Terror, is a valuable book for serious students of
the history of the US Army and a must for readers interested in the
evolution of FM 100-5/3-0, Operations. However, what is still needed is
a companion history of the evolution of the Army’s doctrine for larger
units at the operational level.
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All for the King’s Shilling: The British Soldier Under
Wellington, 1808-1814
By Edward J. Coss
Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri, Department of Military Strategy,
Plans, and Operations, US Army War College

Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2010
392 pages
$39.95

T

his volume is not another narrative history of Wellington’s Peninsular
War. Rather, it is an analysis of the demographics and behavior of the
famed British redcoats. The gist of Coss’s thesis is that these soldiers were
not Britain’s societal rejects. Moreover, their unmatchable cohesion rested
upon a loyalty and mutual trust developed within their small groups.
The book begins with the Duke of Wellington’s famous quote about
his army’s common soldiers being the scum of the earth. Coss provides
Wellington’s later observation in an endnote, i.e., that the Army had
made fine fellows of them. However, this oft-quoted, initial comment
forms the basis for the work’s thesis.
Coss has accomplished phenomenal research. He compiled a British
Soldier Compendium with demographics on 7,300 soldiers, the great
majority from line infantry regiments. He uses a three-tiered model of
compliance theory developed by Steven Westbrook to help interpret this
voluminous data for individuals and small groups. Coss places these
statistics and interpretations in the larger sphere of British society, e.g.,
the severe stresses of industrialization and their costs, both individual
and collective. No less than 78 tables accompany the text. These statistics range from the usual to analyze social origins and economic status
to a fascinating, sweeping examination of soldiers’ nutritional intake.
He admits that he cannot verify how many of the 7,300 served in the
Peninsula between 1808 and 1814. This inability does not detract from
the work, which is a micro-analysis of an army’s soldiery.
The work balances demographics with individual accounts, e.g.,
memoirs and journals. He is well aware of both their benefits and pitfalls. Coss focuses on one man in particular, William Lawrence, as a case
study. His use of these primary sources is generally astute, and adds a
genuinely human dimension. One caveat is that commentaries from soldiers in rifle and light infantry units do not represent “typical” soldiers.
He places his interpretation within the context of one the most
concise analyses of the famed British two-deep line’s battle tactics in
print, indicative of his effort to dissect this force in action. He agrees
that the British possessed no such light troops to support that line until
1800. Such agreement should not dismiss the major accomplishments
of British light troops in the previous century, especially as they often
performed as both skirmishers and shock troops. He deals frankly and
honestly, as best as the extant evidence permits, with the excesses in the
hellish sieges of the Peninsular War.
The work’s comparative analysis states that the British Army of
the Napoleonic Wars was unique with its life-long period of service for
soldiers. Granted, the French term of service of 6 years became standard
with the Jordan Law of 1798. The discussion omits the Russians, but
they represent a stark difference. Indeed, the fatalistic farewell from
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family, household, and village for a conscript was terminal in nature,
given the term of service was 25 years. The Austrians conscripted for
life. The reforms initiated by Archduke Charles reducing the term to 10
years in the infantry began in 1808. The Prussians, humbled and humiliated at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806, initiated necessary, but carefully and
circumspectly, reforms afterwards.
The larger issue is that comparison of terms of service can skew
perspective without a commensurate understanding of the effects. The
allies changed recruiting practices well in the midst of prolonged conflict. There is no indication what proportion of soldiers served shorter
enlistments or when. Such a study is certainly well beyond his scope,
but an understanding is necessary for an effective comparison. The only
release for lifers was death or incapacitation.
The British Army, conversely, went through the greatest fluctuations
in strength upon the outbreak of war, only to shrink as dramatically
at war’s end—as it had in previous conflicts. During the American
Revolution, some 27 percent of British infantry were war-duration and
three-year recruits. For the unprecedented effort against Napoleon, a
force of just over 150,000 in 1804 exceeded 200,000 after 1807, surpassed
250,000 in 1813, fell to 233,852 in 1815, only to drop to an authorized
150,000 after Waterloo, a decrease of 38 percent—after the cumulative
losses of nearly a decade of war against just the First Empire. Coss shows
that only a quarter of the men opted for the optional 7-year term for
soldiers after 1808, but there is no discussion of the ramifications of
the inevitable drawdown to which the British Army had become accustomed. Some life-long recruits were not. There remain questions on the
wider impacts of resort to the militia as a recruiting pool for transfers,
whether a substitute or not.
The work exhibits some hyperbole due to excessive focus on the
demographic statistics with the small-group dynamics. Richard Holmes
in Acts of War (1985) and Holmes with John Keegan in Soldiers (1986)
highlighted the paramount need for multiple factors to promote cohesion, obedience, and collective aggression vice apathy among soldiers’
groups. M. Snape in The Redcoat and Religion (2005) covers the period
of “horse-and-musket” warfare. J. E. Cookson’s “Regimental Worlds”
in Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians (2008) considered the range of experiences of British soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars. Coss may deem
these interpretations excessive or flawed, but the monograph takes
little account of them and none of religion as motivating, unifying, and
steadying factors.
Philip Haythornthwaite in The Armies of Wellington (1994), Holmes in
Redcoat (2001) and Haythornthwaite again in Redcoats (2012) are the latest
recognitions of the social and economic qualifiers for the “lowly origin”
of British rank and file. Wellington’s infamous comment reflected upon
the army’s widespread looting when long out of action, at the expense
of the wounded and follow-on operations after Vittoria. Moreover, he
showcased the differences between Britain’s voluntary enlistment and
European conscription. The fact only one quarter of British recruits
took advantage of a 7-year vice life term of service after 1807 to take a
bigger bounty is a telling commentary. How many faced pre- and postwar life in the Georgian workhouse was likely significant. These realities
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reinforced society’s low regard for soldiers, an attitude which the British
Army’s internal police function merely compounded.
There is insufficient consideration of institutional contributions to
positive group behavior. There is no comprehensive commentary on
the role of company and battalion officers to unit cohesion. Similarly,
there is no assessment of the centrality of the British regimental system
or the increased identification with the infantry division after 1810, the
latter as presented by Antony Brett-James in Life in Wellington’s Army
(1972). Conversely, Coss’s detailed account of periods of prolonged
deprivation is telling yet hardly unique among the armies of the time
and their predecessors for decades. Soldiering was a hard life. An old
saying about campaigning in Spain was that small armies perished and
large ones starved.
All for the King’s Shilling has blazed a new trail. It provides very detailed,
demographic data set in a wider context. The major effort to link those
statistics with the battlefield, behavioral dynamics, and small-group
psychology makes it a praiseworthy contribution in multidisciplinary
studies, but excessive in emphasis, at the expense of other evidence. The
book is still a key monograph on the maintenance of an army during
prolonged, major combat operations for a society with Anglo-Saxon
political reservations on the nature of a regular, standing army—the
essence behind voluntary recruitment vice conscription.
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Grand Strategy, Armed Intervention, and War Termination
The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War
Edited by Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich,
and James Lacey
Reviewed by Major Todd Hertling, Instructor of American Politics, Department
of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy at West Point

A

re you thirsting to find evidence that Otto von Bismarck is the
greatest master of state power politics of all time, and Neville
Chamberlain the worst? You’ll find that and more in this rich anthology
providing seven case studies on the forging—successful and unsuccessful—of grand strategy by statesmen over the ages.
Beginning with some “Thoughts on Grand Strategy” and how the
phrase may be understood—the “intertwining of political, social, and
economic realities with military power as well as a recognition that politics must, in nearly all cases, drive military necessity”—the collection of
insightful essays first leads us to explore historical examples of ineffective strategic approaches.
Interestingly, an analysis of Louis XIV is the first such study, and
it largely focuses on Louis’s strategic failure in abandoning alliances in
favor of unilateral actions that overstretched his state’s resources and
military, bearing striking resemblance to current US travails. “British
Grand Strategy, 1933-1942” is another provocative case study underscoring what not to do, as it details Neville Chamberlain’s strategic blunder
in focusing on preventing war even as Germany rearmed, ignored the
Munich Conference, and marched on and occupied Czechoslovakia.
Both are great lessons underscoring the importance of matching strategy with reality, and describing what happens when that does not occur.
Reversing course and providing examples in effective grand strategy, the authors then take us on a journey detailing the strategic acumen
of Bismarck, Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Harry
Truman. From Bismarck’s diplomatic and military genius in establishing Prussia’s dominant power status in Europe, to Roosevelt’s decision
in prioritizing the European theater over the Pacific, and finally to
Truman’s containment policy, there is much to learn from what they
got right, making this a valuable tome in the professional libraries of
scholars and statesmen alike.
The authors, who comprise university professors and scholars alike,
are compelling and thoughtful in their detailed analyses, and the implications for US grand strategy are clear, if not explicit. In the chapters
detailing the reign of Louis XIV and the British strategic shift prior
to World War I, references to US overstretch are plainly stated and
mostly convincing. Also implied in the effective strategies of Roosevelt
and Truman is the importance of prioritizing world challenges, though
there are no notable recommendations given for US policymakers and
thinkers today.
The authors are also careful to point out that grand strategy is largely
determined by uncertainty, such that, in the words of Bismarck, “man
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cannot create the current of events. He can only float with it and steer.”
This is an important point that gains attention throughout the work.
It is certainly nice to see an acknowledgement of the lack of control
world leaders may have over their states’ affairs and the unpredictable
dynamics of the international system, but if there is a shortcoming in
this collection, it is in its almost apologetic tone for the predictive value
of its own case studies.
For example, one editor observes that “conditions encouraging even
the formulation, let alone the prolonged execution, of grand strategy
as deliberate method seem to be uncommon at best, and even then
impermanent.” The reader is first led to believe in the political talent
of Bismarck only to be let down when he later learns that the Prussian
leader’s artfully-constructed European balance of power was uniformly
and unabashedly dismantled by Kaiser Wilhelm II. In the book’s summarizing chapter, we are told that only two of the seven cases—both
involving the United States—suggest a deliberate, preconceived strategy
that resulted from analysis of the challenge in question. The lesson all
too frequently seems to be that successful grand strategy resides at the
intersection of chance and luck, with intellectual prowess, vision, and
leadership playing only a combined secondary role. This is a bitter pill
to swallow for earnest visionaries.
Although it is quite evident the editors intended each chapter to be
a stand-alone study in grand strategy (the book is wonderful for the university professor or military instructor in this regard), the organization
of the anthology would likely benefit from smoother transitions. It is
quite an intellectual jump from “The Grand Strategy of the Grand Siècle:
Learning from the Wars of Louis XIV” at the beginning to “Harry S.
Truman and the Forming of American Grand Strategy in the Cold War,
1945-1953” at the end. This is a lot of ground to cover in 269 pages, and
it requires some mental agility from the reader, particularly with the rich
and dense nature of each chapter. As Lieutenant Colonel Frank Slade,
played by Al Pacino, says in Scent of a Woman, “Too big a leap for me right
now, Charlie.”
All told, The Shaping of Grand Strateg y is a worthwhile read, for both
the historian and the strategist. Strong in theory and concrete in its
examples, the work serves as a practical guide for avoiding the pitfalls of
some and seizing on the attributes of others. It would be desirable to find
a second volume of this work, perhaps with case studies examining the
grand strategy—or lack thereof—of world players in the post-Cold War
era. The authors have done a nice job of setting the conditions for such
a follow-on work that could connect the dots between Bismarck and
statesmen and women today who must strategize in a modern era when
the nation-state lines are not as clear, and the role of nonstate actors is
more prominent.
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Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts
By Aysegul Aydin
Reviewed by CPT(P) Charles D. Lewis, Instructor of American Politics, Policy,
and Strategy, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy
at West Point

R

easons are always abundant when the United States decides to
intervene in an internal conflict. Politicians justify responses out
of national interest. The media provide lasting images from the conflict,
sometimes turning public opinion. International organizations react to
violations of their laws or articles. While each reason might play a small
role in intervention, Aysegul Aydin in Foreign Powers and Intervention in
Armed Conflicts demonstrates domestic politics and economic concerns
dominate intervention decisions.
Aydin advocates a framework emphasizing the role of domestic economic interests in international affairs. Viewing intervention
through the lens of economic liberalism—explaining issues “around the
core relationship of economic interests and their reflection on foreign
policy through domestic political processes”—this book brings to the
forefront internal dynamics in intervention. Beginning with the classification and definition of many frameworks, Aydin takes the reader
through a literature review of scholarly intervention work to highlight
liberalism as a substitute for realism. Shifting to quantitative data to
stress the role of international trade, Aydin closes with a series of case
studies highlighting the United States’ involvement in both civil wars
and international conflicts.
For any reader outside the academic community, the beauty of the
book does not appear until Chapter 5. The previous chapters present the
reader with an exhaustive and dense theoretical framework that creates a
link between economics and a state’s international role. Aydin then uses
Chapter 2 to clarify multiple versions of intervention. Ranging from the
classic response to war, to postconflict involvement to preserve peace,
this chapter discusses the timing of the intervention, international law
through the United Nations, and when coalitions are involved.
Once through the meticulous and tedious definition of intervention, Aydin breaks liberalism down in Chapter 3, "Defending Economic
Interests Abroad." Liberalism—at least to Aydin—is not meant to replace
other theories, nor does it suggest that force must be eliminated from
conflict. Instead, liberalism describes the circumstances surrounding the
likelihood of force and highlights the relationship between foreign policy
and economic interests. This understanding comes from a “bottom-up
view of political decision making” that identifies the fundamental role
individuals and private groups play. While the influence individuals have
on public policy and intervention might seem distasteful—especially
given the effects of any intervention—this chapter clarifies the role of
small groups in different types of governments. Overall, Aydin does an
excellent job of highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of economic
liberalism, but loses readers due to this section’s length, which would
benefit from a consolidation of definitions.
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Unfortunately, the reader turns the page to Chapter 4, "In
International Conflicts," and is faced with a slog of quantitative data.
While empirical data is needed to prove the validity of Aydin’s hypotheses, the presentation challenges any reader unfamiliar with regression
tables. As a result, the amount of models tested can overwhelm some
and limits this book’s audience to only those familiar with, or interested
in, these techniques.
The book closes strongly with a case study analysis as a test of
Aydin’s theory. Aydin reengages readers by intertwining economic liberalism with a brief history of American intervention. Through cases
on twentieth-century conflict, Aydin focuses on two themes of US
involvement: containing regional aggressors who threaten stability and
keeping “direct military involvement at the minimum level possible.”
At first glance, the second theme appears weak but is later clarified as
Aydin uses case studies to demonstrate influence through trade and ally
relationships. Taking readers back through American history, Aydin
uses Central American policy and Eisenhower’s actions in the Middle
East to invite the reader back into this book. Readers in the defense
community will appreciate the successful application of Aydin’s theory
without the need to overemphasize quantitative data. In reading these
cases, we come to understand the role trade and preserving the status
quo plays in international policy.
Taking the case study analysis one step further, Aydin provides a
chapter relevant to ongoing intervention debates in countries like Syria.
Aydin ties together both quantitative and case study analyses to show
that economic liberalism can also explain intervention in civil wars in
Africa. Through this chapter’s analysis, the book provides the reader
insight into the decline in international conflict and today’s increase in
“civil violence.” Despite the change in the type of conflict, intervention
still occurs through diplomacy to maintain the same themes—status
quo and limited direct military intervention—potentially explaining
current American policies.
Not for all readers, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts
provides an economic view of intervention where states try to limit
involvement until conflict affects the public good. Not quite providing
the reasons most Americans are used to hearing on the nightly news,
Aydin’s book is also not what the reader expects when picking up a
book this size. While the book would benefit from combining the data
with the case studies, Aydin’s economic liberalism proposal provides
another alternative to when countries intervene, allowing the defense
professional to add another perspective.
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Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy
By Dominic J. Caraccilo
Reviewed by Major Ruth A. Mower, Instructor of International Relations and
Comparative Politics, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military
Academy

A

s the United States continues to fight in the Global War on Terror
over a decade after its start, Dominic J. Caraccilo’s Beyond Guns and
Steel: A War Termination Strategy is long overdue and a welcome addition
to the literature on war termination and conflict resolution. Much too
often in today’s ambiguous operational environment America’s national
command authority lacks concise strategic objectives, which is why the
United States unfortunately finds it is merely conducting crisis management, at best resulting in a murky transition from conflict to peace.
Colonel Caraccilo ultimately hopes that with his words the “fog of
postwar” activities can finally lift.
While Colonel Caraccilo led multiple Army units in combat during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, he noticed that a fine line existed between
the tasks the military was expected to perform in comparison to
those under the purview of civilian agencies and locally elected governance. Needless-to-say, a plan that went beyond simply defeating the
enemy was not established prior to the start of the war in Iraq as Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Thomas E. Ricks, Bob Woodward, and many other
authors have since revealed in embarrassing and excruciating detail.
Therefore, Colonel Caraccilo asserts nations need a grand strateg y when
it comes to conflict: clear and concise objectives prior to the start of
actual conflict should become a required part of the planning process
and remain an absolute necessity.
To arrive at how nations can determine these objectives, Colonel
Caraccilo first describes why nations choose to conduct war and what
events usually occur that ultimately affect how and when nations decide
to end conflicts. Specifically, Colonel Caraccilo defines and provides
examples of the six general categories that war termination rationale fall
under as devised by B. G. Clarke in his rational model for conflict termination. Colonel Caraccilo then maintains that ten additional categories
dedicated to conflict resolution, instead of only the six which address
war termination, should also be used by nations during initial planning
phases to include: nation building, economic development, humanitarian relief, and establishing democratic nations just to name a few. Next,
Colonel Caraccilo defines in great detail many of the strategic terms
used when discussing war termination, as well as briefly discussing how
strategy, grand strategy, policy, and strategic communications relate.
Colonel Caraccilo offers “good” examples of when nations successfully plan war termination, conflict resolution, and definitive exit
strategies as a part of their formulation and execution of national policy.
Positive case studies analyzed include: the United States’ Marshall Plan
following WWII; Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty as a part
of American action in Panama; Operation Desert Storm; the Global
War on Terror and its use of COIN theorems; Operation Iraqi Freedom;
and even a non-US example involving Uruguay and the Tupamaro. Of
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course, “bad” examples are also needed to help prove why the fusion of
war termination and conflict resolution is so vital: the Korean War; the
1956 Suez Crisis; the Global War on Terror and its focus on ideology; US
involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, and Bosnia; and America’s on-going
involvement in Afghanistan. After these case studies, Colonel Caraccilo
reveals how interagency inadequacies in the US government are the
primary culprits as to why war termination and conflict resolution are
often overlooked. Hence, Colonel Caraccilo stresses such agencies need
to better nest their goals and objectives to observe and realize how these
desired end-states relate to the nation’s grand strategy. Finally, Colonel
Caraccilo describes how extensive interagency planning teams are
needed to define how and when military transition after conflict should
occur, which will also simultaneously address the frequent absence of
a fully developed approach to conflict termination within America’s
warfighting doctrine.
Colonel Caraccilo’s chapter on definitions, as well as the extensive
list of references used throughout the book, are some of his work’s most
impressive attributes; if one wishes to analyze any aspect of conflict resolution and war termination, this is the book to refer to to find pivotal
publications on the matter, and to fundamentally understand government agencies’ jargon. Yet some of his case studies are a bit confusing
since they tend to weaken his overall argument. How can the War on
Terror, regardless of what aspect of it is analyzed, be considered both a
success and a failure? Plus, why is Operation Iraqi Freedom presented in
the introduction as a massive failure when it comes to war termination
and conflict resolution, and then placed in the success chapter regardless if new, effective leadership is what helped bring the longer than
initially expected war to a close? Additionally, the entire chapter on the
categories of war termination seemed redundant; if the six war termination classifications of B. G. Clarke are widely accepted, more emphasis
should have then been placed on why Colonel Caraccilo feels so strongly
his additional ten categories for conflict resolution are more important
even if frequently overlooked. Had Colonel Caraccilo cut this portion,
he would have also had more space to dedicate to further enhancing his
subsequent chapters.
While Colonel Caraccilo did touch on the fact that resources frequently dictate necessity, he can and should analyze in greater detail and
define what America’s current grand strategic objectives are. Only when
those objectives align with nation building, establishing democracy,
humanitarian assistance, economic development, and the many other
conflict resolution classifications that Colonel Caraccilo presents, will
money transition from one national agency to another, thus lowering
some of the competing interests that various components of the US
government have. Then, many more levels of the American government
might actually feel compelled to work toward both war termination
and conflict resolution if and when the nation finds itself at war, which
Colonel Caraccilo correctly highlights as one of the most pressing issues
facing both military and civilian planners today.

